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. JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
BELOW 
This Appeal is from a final judgment of the Salt Lake 
Department Circuit Court which was rendered on the 28th day of 
April, 1989, conferring jurisdiction on this Court to hear the 
Appeal under UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. Section 78-2A-3(C). 
5. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING THE 
QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE WAS REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE DEFENDANT 
CAUSED AN ACCIDENT AND WAS THEREB = -3 OFFENSE OF 
COLLIDING AND FAILING TO REPORT THE H11 AND-RUN INFRACTION ARE 
INADEQUATE 7'.'; SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL CONCLUSION BECAUSE 
THEY \^CY ' •CESSARY SPECIFICITY. 
1 HE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND ITS RESULTING 
CONCLUSION THAT DEFENDANT WHITE CAUSED AN ACCIDENT, WHICH HE FAILED 
TO REPORT I.AC'h FVIPENTJARY SUPPORT. 
6. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
(Hi JamMi y II, 198M, Defendant While Wdi.i in the Count./ 
Complex in Salt Lake City, Utah where he was participating in 
Property Tax Hearings regarding properties he was managing. He had 
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arrived for the Hearings, which were scheduled at 9:30 AM, between 
9:15 AM and 9:20 AM so that he could locate the room where the 
Hearings were to be held. Defendant White parked his car heading 
north at the County Complex and noticed a brown car in front of 
him. Between 10:30 AM and 11:00 AM, he had concluded his Hearings 
and other business and left the building to get in his car. As he 
approached his car, he found a police officer walking around his 
car. The Police Officer accused Mr. White of striking a green BMW 
which was allegedly facing south and parked in the spot in front 
of his car. The Police Officer cited Defendant White for violating 
Salt Lake City Revised Ordinances Section 12-16-060 for failure to 
stop and remain at the scene of the accident. 
The complaining witness and owner of the green BMW is John 
Johnson, an Attorney and part-time Salt Lake City Prosecutor. Prior 
to the Criminal Trial on April 28th, 1989, Mr. Johnson filed a 
Civil Action in the Small Claims Court of the Circuit Court, Salt 
Lake County, Salt Lake Department, claiming that Defendant had 
damaged his automobile and was liable for damages. The trial was 
held on April 25, 1989 and the Judge Pro Tern found for the 
Defendant White. 
The Criminal Trial was held on April 28, 1989. The issue at 
trial was whether Defendant White failed to stop and remain at the 
scene of an accident. However, it had first to be determined 
whether there was an accident. There were no eyewitnesses to any 
accident and therefore Salt Lake City and Mr. Johnson had to 
construct circumstances under which Mr. White caused the accident 
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which he allegedly failed to report. Mr. White contended that he 
caused no accident, that he did not hit Mr. Johnson's parked car 
and therefore did not have an accident to report. Judge McCleve 
found Mr. White guilty "of the offense of colliding and failing to 
report the hit-and-run infraction" and ordered Mr. White to pay 
restitution of $403.75 plus a $150.00 fine with all but $50.00 
suspended upon payment of restitution. 
Mr. Johnson appealed the decision of the Small Claims Court 
to the Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, Murray Department, where 
Judge M.D. Jones found in a Trial De Novo on July 14, 1989 against 
Mr. Johnson and dismissed the case. 
Mr. White appealed the Criminal Case from the Salt Lake 
Department Circuit Court on May 15, 1989. 
B. FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Since there were no eyewitnesses, Mr. Johnson and the 
investigating officer, Mr. Faraone, had to construct a situation 
which would show that Mr. White bumped into Mr. Johnson's car, 
caused damage to the automobile, and left the scene of the 
accident. In their attempt to do this, the facts relevant to the 
issues presented for review can be placed in three main categories, 
as follows: 
1. TIME when Mr. White allegedly struck Mr. Johnson's 
car; 
2. Whether the DAMAGE to Mr. Johnson's car could have 
been caused by Mr. White's car; 
3. Whether the DIRECTION in which Mr. White's car was 
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construed to be traveling and whether the POSITION in which Mr. 
White's car was parked would indicate beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Mr. White had struck Mr. Johnson's car. 
The relevant FACTS in each of the categories are as follows: 
1. TIME 
a. Mr. Johnson parked his car at 9:30 AM on January 11, 
1989. See Police Report, p. 2. The investigating officer, Mr. 
Faraone, also testified that Mr. Johnson told him that 9:30AM was 
the time he arrived. See Transcript, p.37, Lines 20-24. 
b. Mr. White's first Tax Hearing at the County Complex 
was set for 9:30AM. See Defendant's Exhibit 1 and Transcript, 43, 
Line 22. 
c. Therefore, Mr. White arrived early to find the room 
of the Tax Hearing and parked his car between 9:15 AM and 9:20 AM 
on January 11, 1989. See Transcript, p. 44, Line 17. 
2. DAMAGE to Mr. Johnson's automobile 
a. The right front hood area of Mr. Johnson's car, which 
was pointing south, was damaged. See Police Report, p.2. 
b. The damage was in a "V" shape with a well-defined line 
in the middle of the "V". Defendant's Exhibits 5 and 6 and 
Transcript, p.57, Lines 13,14. 
c. The black bumper guard on Mr. White's automobile was 
2 1/2 inches wide. See Transcript, p. 58, Line 22. 
d. The investigating officer, Mr. Faraone made no 
measurements of the dent in Mr. Johnson's car or the bumper on Mr. 
White's car. See Transcript, p. 39, Line 2. 
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d. Rust and paint chips on Mr. Johnson's car all along 
the front of the hood. See Defendant's Exhibit 7 and Transcript, 
p.58, Lines 7 to 13. 
e. Officer Faraone saw no other damage on Mr. Johnson's 
car other than the little dent in the front. See Transcript, p. 
73, lines 20-25 
f. No damage to bumper of Mr. Johnson's car. See 
Transcript, p. 17, Line 2. 
g. The bumper on Mr. Johnson's car stuck out 7 inches 
from the grill of his car. See Transcript, p. 56, Line 1. 
h. No damage to grill of Mr. Johnson's car. See 
Transcript, p. 17, Line 11. 
i. Measurement from ground to bottom of Mr. White's car 
is 18 1/2 inches. See Transcript p. 56, Line 11. 
j. Measurement from ground to top of bumper of Mr. 
Johnson's car is 19 1/2 to 20 inches. See Transcript p. 56, Line 
11. 
k. Snow on the ground was 1/2 to 1 inch deep. See 
Transcript, p. 26, Lines 11,12. 
1. Snow was soft and the heavy Mr. White's heavy Suburban 
could compact the snow. See Transcript p. 73, Lines 9-19. 
m. Officer Faraone allegedly "removed" glob of green 
paint, which appeared to be similar in color to that of Mr. 
Johnson's car, from Mr. White's car. See Transcript p. 23, Lines 
1-7. 
n. Officer Faraone does not remember where he found the 
7 
paint on Mr. White's car. See Transcript p. 35f Lines 19-22. 
o. Officer Faraone did not show the paint to Mr. White. 
See Transcript p. 35, Line 16 and P. 51, Line 5 
p. Officer Faraone and Mr. White did not even look at the 
point on the Suburban where the paint was supposed to have 
transferred to. See Transcript p. 50, Line 23. 
q. Mr. White looked at his bumper after he returned to 
the office and found only white stuff, like bird stuff. See 
Transcript p. 51, Lines 8-21. 
s. Neither Mr. Johnson, the City Prosecutor, nor Officer 
Faraone offered the "glob" of paint, nor any paint analysis as 
evidence. 
3. DIRECTION AND POSITION OF THE PARTIES' CARS 
a. Mr. Johnson testified that he found Mr. White's 
Suburban parked to the south of him, approximately two inches away. 
See Transcript p. 6, Line 9 
b. Mr. Johnson testified in the Criminal Court that Mr. 
White's Suburban was parked head on and straight at a 90 degree 
angle to his BMW. See Transcript p. 11, Line 11 and p. 12, Lines 
16-23. 
c. The Police Report showed Mr. White's Suburban parked 
head on and straight at a 90 degree angle to Mr. Johnson's BMW. See 
Police Report, p. 2. 
d. Mr. Johnson testified in Small Claims Court that Mr. 
White's Suburban was parked at an angle off of 90 degrees in the 
stall. See Transcript, p. 11, Lines 20-23. 
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e. Then Mr. Johnson testified in the Criminal Court that 
Mr. White's Suburban was parked at an angle off of 90 degrees 
facing northeast in the parking stall, because if he had been 
parked straight on, there would have been damage to both sides of 
the vehicle, instead on just the one right front side. See 
Transcript, p. 11, Lines 2-9 and p. 13, Lines 3-16. 
f. However, officer Faraone testified that Mr. White's 
Suburban was head-on to Mr. Johnson's BMW and not at the angle 
shown by Mr. Johnson. See Transcript p. 22, Lines 11-16. 
g. Officer Faraone testified that he constructed that Mr. 
White's Suburban came in at a northeast angle so that the leading 
edge, which is the left front bumper of Mr. White's Suburban, 
struck the right front of Mr. Johnson's BMW, then continued in its 
turn till it ended straight on. See Transcript p. 31, Lines 1-23. 
h. Mr. White testified that as he pulled into the parking 
stall, he made a wide turn, pulling far to the right, coming in so 
that he would come in straight. He brushed a barrel in the right 
hand edge of his stall, stopped, got out, moved the barrel, then 
drove, at a "barely creeping" speed, his car about a foot to a 
foot and a half to the parked position. See Transcript p. 46, 
Lines 1-22 and p. 50, Lines 3-7. 
i. Other than nicking the barrel, Mr. White did not hit 
anthing else. See Transcript p. 47, Lines 6-8. 
j. Officer Faraone later testified that Mr. White made 
a wide turn into the parking stall so that the right front tire 
left the right side of the parking stall and ended up straight, 
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with the front wheels facing northwest. See Transcript, pp 66, 67, 
Lines 9-6. 
7. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT DETAIL THE FINDINGS OF FACT 
SUFFICIENTLY AND DID NOT INCLUDE ENOUGH SUBSIDIARY FACTS TO 
DISCLOSE THE STEPS BY WHICH THE ULTIMATE CONCLUSION ON EACH FACTUAL 
ISSUE WAS RAISED. 
B. THE INCONSISTENT, CONFLICTING EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY 
SALT LAKE CITY, OFFICER FARAONE AND MR. JOHNSON CANNOT BE LEGALLY 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE INADEQUATE FINDINGS, WHICH ARE AGAINST 
THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
8. ARGUMENTS 
A. THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT DETAIL THE FINDINGS OF FACT 
SUFFICIENTLY AND DID NOT INCLUDE ENOUGH SUBSIDIARY FACTS TO 
DISCLOSE THE STEPS BY WHICH THE ULTIMATE CONCLUSION ON EACH FACTUAL 
ISSUE WAS RAISED. 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires 
the judge in a bench trial to "find the facts specially and state 
separately its conclusions of law thereon" Rule 52(a) applies in 
criminal cases by virtue of Utah Code Ann. 77-35-26(g) (1982) which 
provides: "The rules of civil procedure relating to appeals shall 
govern criminal appeals to the Supreme Court except as otherwise 
provided." 
Judge McCleve's Findings of Fact are quoted in pertinent part 
as follows: 
"I believe his (Officer Faraone's) testimony is 
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consistent with the laws of physics, and consistent—the 
physical evidence consistent with the testimony offered 
by Mr. Johnson in his observations." . . . 
"I am convinced by the physical evidence as well as 
the testimony and observations of the individuals 
involved, the paint transfer is consistent, I can't— 
there isn't a reason for the Court to explain that away, 
I can't explain that to the damage fitting like puzzle 
pieces, the tire tracks, the explanation of Officer 
Faraone as to how the accident could occur, it's all 
consistent to—both with the laws of physics, and with 
what's been charged." 
In Rucker v. Da It on, 598 P2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that "the importance of complete, accurate and 
consistent findings of fact in a case tried by a judge is essential 
to the resolution of dispute under the proper rule of law. To that 
end, the findings should be sufficiently detailed and include 
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factual issue was raised." (underlining 
supplied) . The Trial Judge did not even make an attempt to detail 
sufficiently and include enough subsidiary facts in its findings 
to explain how it arrived at its conclusions in the face of the 
extremely inconsistent and inconclusive evidence presented by Salt 
Lake City and against the weight of the evidence presented by Mr. 
White. Of utmost importance, the Trial Court paid no attention and 
made no Finding of Fact regarding the TIME when the respective cars 
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arrived at the scene. The evidence showed and there was no 
rebuttal that Mr. Johnson arrived and parked his car AFTER Mr. 
White had already parked his car and was already in a Tax Hearing. 
(See Factual Issues 6 B la-c above.) 
The Trial Court made its findings on the laws of "physics" but 
did not detail at all which of the theories presented by Officer 
Faraone and Mr. Johnson were explained by the laws of physics. 
Based on the evidence presented, ie, speculation about how fast Mr. 
White's Suburban could have been going and in what direction, it 
is impossible to apply the laws of "physics" to reach any 
conclusion. Mr. Johnson testified in the Small Claims Court that 
Mr. White's car was parked head on at a 90 degree angle, as was 
reported in the Police Report. However, if Mr. White had have 
ended up parked as set forth in the Police Report, he would have 
damaged both sides of his (Mr. Johnson's) car. Mr. Johnson 
therefore changed his testimony to say that Mr. White's car parked 
at an angle facing northeast, so as to hit Mr. Johnson's car with 
his left front bumper. (See 6 B 3a-e above) . Officer Faraone also 
testified of two different ways that Mr. White pulled into the 
parking space. (See 6 B 3f-j above). If Mr. White had have pulled 
into the parking space at an angle going northeast, so that the 
leading edge of the car, the left front bumper, hit the right front 
edge of Mr. Johnson's car, the right front wheel of Mr. White's car 
would not have been far to the right in the next stall east, as 
Officer Faraone testified. If, on the other hand, Mr. White's car 
did pull far to the right in the next stall east, the leading edge 
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of Mr. White's car would have been the right front bumper, and not 
the left front bumper as Offi cer Faraoi :ie testi fi ed. Which way did 
Mi White pul ] in? The answer is a required subsidiary finding 
of fact, but the Trial Court made no such finding of fact in order 
t o e x p l a :I i i h :: u t::l ne ] a M s of physics app] led or even which theory 
applied. 
The Trial C o m -^:d n <* * - paint transfer is 
c- • - i'o\ • . physic evidence of any paint 
transfer ^ evidence that the paint transfer was not 
shown i * White * 4 line ui c h e a c c i d e n t , wit!" ni-itlier 
Offi cer • . ohnson able to tel 1 where the paint 
allegedly v* i •, found •* Wh ite" s car , with the inconsistent 
evidence ** * • i*ts accident was supposed tn have happeni"!, there 
was. in'. * findina * * f act as to any details of. a paint 
transfer * explain how whether an accident was caused by Mr. 
White. (See 6 B 2m-s above). 
As to the "damage fitting like puzzle pieces", there was no 
attempt to detail the finding in order to explain the evidence that 
the dent was a "V " sh.ifjo, w i t h i wel 1 dtjfinei1 * ;. n ] : 1 P 
of the "V", and yet the bumpei on Mr, White's car wv.- ., ; .- . riches 
wide and could not have formed the distinct line ±ii : middle 
the "V" (RfM h h / .'Hi c dbovr-?) . There- W M S no specificity in * * 
fi nding that the damage fi t like puzzle pieces as to how damage 
could have occurred when i t was physically impossible ten: Mir , 
White's bumper, whi ch was 1 ower than the top of Mr. Johnson bumper , 
not to have caused damage to Mr. Johnson's bumper or grill. (See 
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6 B 2 e-1 above). There was no finding regarding Mr. Johnson's 
testimony that if the Suburban were head-on to the BMW, as per the 
Police Report, the BMW would have been damaged on both sides of the 
hood, rather than just the one side. Where is that piece of the 
puzzle? 
As to the finding of the "tire tracks", there was no 
specificity as to how the tire tracks, which showed that Mr. 
White's car swung far to the right, bringing the right front bumper 
as the leading edge in first, could possibly have caused the 
damage, particularly since all testimony was that the left front 
bumper allegedly contained the "glob of paint". 
As to the Trial Court's finding that Officer Faraone's 
explanation could occur, there was no finding at all as to how it 
did occur, and there was no finding as to which of Officer 
Faraone's explanations was the one accepted by the Trial Court. See 
6 B 3 f-j above). 
When all of the issues of fact are reviewed and considered, 
it is obvious that the Trial Court's Findings of Fact are mere 
conclusions, which do not state any specificity as to any finding 
or conclusion of a fact in issue. The failure of the trial court 
to make findings on all material issues is reversible error unless 
the facts in the record are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of 
supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment. See Kinkella 
v. Bouah, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983). 
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i! iiih INCONSISTENT, CONFLICTING EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY SALT 
LAKE CITY, OFFICER FARAONE AND MR JOHNSON CANNOT BE LEGALLY 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE INADEQUATE FJNDINGK, WHICH AKR AGAINST 
THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated i n Re id v. Mutual of Omaha 
Insurance Company ,  I I (> 111 . t h Ai1 v , - * - p(j-e i. ant 
must demonstrate that the evidence i h Legally insufficient to 
support tilt findings even iewing 3+ .-. thn »iqhr ir.cst *avorable 
1 * - * - , evidence is 
determined : u standard set Rule 52 -t * which 
provides "Findings of fact, whether based \ u i ui document * , 
e v i d e i i c e, s 1 i a 1 1! i i c t b e s e 1: a s i d e u i :i ] e s s c 1 e a i ] y err one ou s . , . " 
The Utah Supreme Court State v. Walker, 721 P. 2d 19 1 \ Ut ah , 
1987) defined tnt- standard : review as being that set forth in Hie 
Fee*
 : .- ; . tinq Wright & Mil lei at 192, 
193, the Court quoted the following: 
•iIt is not accurate to say that the appelate court takes 
that view of the evidence that is most favorable to the 
appellee, that it assumes that conflicts in the evidence 
were resolved in his favor, and that he must be given the 
benefit of all favorable inferences. All of this is true 
in reviewing a jury verdict. It is not true when it is 
findings of the court that are being reviewed. Instead, 
the appellate court may examine all of the evidence in 
the record. It will presume that the trial court relied 
only on evidence properly admissible in making its 
finding in the absence of a clear showing to the 
contrary. It must give great weight to the findings made 
and the inferences drawn by the trial judge, but it must 
reject his finding if it considers them to be clearly 
erroneous. Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, sec. 2585. 
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The Supreme Court in the Walker case then went on to clarify 
"clearly erroneous" to mean that if the findings are against the 
clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court ptherwise 
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made, the findings (or verdict) will be set aside. 
The clear weight of the evidence is certainly enough to create 
a reasonable doubt that Mr. White caused any accident and therefore 
was not guilty "of the offense of colliding and failing to report 
the hit-and-run infraction". First, and above all, the clear 
weight of the evidence shows that Mr. Johnson parked his car AFTER 
Mr. White had already parked his car and was in the Tax Hearings. 
(See 6 B la-c above). Mr. White could not have hit Mr. Johnson's 
car because it was not yet parked in the stall north of him. 
There is reasonable doubt as to how the accident allegedly 
happened because there is conflicting, inconsistent supositions 
from both Mr. Johnson and Officer Faraone as to how Mr. White's car 
entered his parking lane, how it proceeded through the parking lane 
and how it allegedly caused the damage. (See 6 B 2 and 3 above) . 
The measurements of the fronts of the respective automobiles render 
it virtually impossible for the damage to have occurred as 
testified by Mr. Johnson and Officer Faraone. (See 6 B 2e-l above). 
The damage which allegedly occurred does not match up either with 
any of the theories or the evidence presented by Mr. Johnson and 
Officer Faraone. (See 6 B 2 and 3 above). 
Without again reciting the facts set forth in 6 B above and 
the arguments set forth in 8 A above, a review of those facts and 
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aar cjument s will s h o w thud* if 111. o b v i o u s 'lli.il t I K ev nU n r e p r e s e n t e d 
does support the conclusions reached by the trial court. There 
is at the very least a reasonable doubt that Mr. White struck Mr. 
i J o h n s o n • s iri'i if iril ti I I . 
9 EELIEP SOUGHT 
Mr. White seeks to have the Appeals Court set as:i de the 
Verdict i " '\v Ti id J Co epaymen I: c >f tl le 
restitutio -i- * '. i * paid by Mr. White, payment of Mi White's 
attorney fees - dismissal •- the case 
DATE E •. er , 1 989. 
/John M. Wunderli 
Attorney for Appellant 
Stephen C White 
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